

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110007-2

31 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of North Vietnam

1. On 27 October, the Director called me with reference to Mr. Proctor's attached note to him regarding the problems with which the intelligence community would be faced if reconnaissance over North Vietnam were severely curtailed. I told the Director that I had already requested a note on this subject from [REDACTED] of OER, which I had just received. [REDACTED] note covered the question very well in succinct form and highlighted the problems involved. I assured the Director that at the next feasible opportunity I would raise this matter with some senior member of the NSC Staff to be sure they were put on notice regarding it.

2. When Dr. Kissinger called on Saturday morning (28 October) and asked me to come see him in his office, I availed myself of the occasion to take with me a copy of [REDACTED] note on reconnaissance. During the course of our rather long conversation on various Vietnam-related matters, I handed this note to Dr. Kissinger emphasizing the seriousness of the potential problem. He assured me he understood the problem and would read [REDACTED] note with great interest.

3. The subject of reconnaissance again arose at the WSAG meeting on Monday, 30 October. It was discussed there in rather general terms with Dr. Kissinger acknowledging -- in response to a direct question -- that reconnaissance was not being flown over North Vietnam north of the 20th Parallel at this time nor would reconnaissance by "manned aircraft" be flown over North Vietnam once a cease-fire agreement had been signed. During the lull in the conversation that followed Dr. Kissinger's comment, I interjected to ask if this ban on manned flight included SR-71's. He was clearly displeased with having the

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110007-2

question raised though he used as the pretext for his displeasure the fact that I had raised it in a WSAG Committee meeting when it was properly 40 Committee business. (This is decidedly a non-issue since the membership of the two groups is virtually identical.) Dr. Kissinger's answer can best be described as a grudging "yes," though it was apparent that from his present thinking SR-71 flights over North Vietnam will be subject to the same tight-top-level policy control as are SR-71 flights today over North Korea or Communist China.

4. The reconnaissance issue was also discussed at the first meeting of the WSAG intelligence working group (Group C) held in my office on Tuesday, 31 October. The nature of this discussion with other matters at that meeting will be covered by [REDACTED] in his memorandum for the record on it.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

25X1

[REDACTED]
O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee
Copy No. 1 - DCI-VAS/RAC for file
Copy No. 1A - Dr. Kissinger
Copy No. 2 - ADDI
Copy No. 3 - D/OCI
Copy No. 4 - C/OER/D/S
Copy No. 5 - GAC Chrono
Copy No. 6 - Kissinger Memos file
Copy No. 7 - D/IAS

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110007-2

DATE: 28 Oct 72

TO: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached are two memoranda prepared for me by my associates. I thought you might find them of interest and am hence forwarding the attached copies for your information.

15/
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

25X1



Cy 1(A); Copy 5-GAC Chrono
y 1(A); Copy 2-GAC Chrono

25X1



*1 - Kissinger Memos
+ VAS/RAC*

C
U
R
R
E
N
T
I
N
F
O
R
M
A
T
I
O
N

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110007-2

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110007-2